BRICS and the Future of Strategic Non-alignment

The 17th BRICS Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, was a relatively subdued affair. The conspicuous absence of the heads of state from nearly half of the ten full BRICS members – including Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, China’s President Xi Jinping, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian – somewhat dampened the gathering’s profile, also highlighting it as a lower geopolitical priority amid a range of concurrent crises, most notably in the Middle East. Brazil, as host, also deliberately shaped the summit’s agenda to downplay the anti-Western identity often associated with the BRICS grouping, instead steering the focus toward less geopolitically charged but equally pressing issues for the Global South, such as sustainable development, global governance reforms, climate finance, the green transition and boosting South-to-South cooperation. While this approach may have been partly motivated by a desire to avoid antagonising an increasingly jittery United States under President Donald Trump’s second administration, it also reflected Brazil’s long-standing foreign-policy ethos and its BRICS positioning, which has been rooted in non-alignment, multilateralism and a proud Global South identity.

Brazil has long championed the strategic value of non-alignment for emerging Global South powers while acting as a moderating force within BRICS to make it a non-Western, rather than anti-Western, coalition. However, this approach, along with the BRICS project’s outlook and viability, is likely to be called into question by the current geopolitical climate, marked by intensifying great-power competition and a worsening crisis of the rule-based order. At the same time, certain factors may facilitate non-alignment, or rather multi-alignment, to evolve into a viable alternative amid global fragmentation.

Increasing constraints on ‘fence-sitting’

In his opening speech, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva aptly summarised the state of the global order, referring to an unprecedented collapse of multilateralism and shrinking room for manoeuvre by BRICS – which he defined as the heir of the Non-Aligned Movement – and therefore by extension the Global South. The current global backdrop appears especially challenging for emerging countries striving to pursue an independent foreign policy while maintaining good relations with major powers, particularly the increasingly antagonistic US and China. It is also not particularly conducive for advances in the Global South’s priority areas, such as trade, climate (including climate finance) and development, as Western countries increasingly shift their focus towards defence spending amid renewed inter-state conflicts and rising geopolitical tensions.

Many emerging economies initially welcomed Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, viewing it as a departure from what was often perceived as condescending lecturing on democratic principles from the West. However, Trump’s dismissal of multilateral norms and the advances made in the areas of trade and climate, his weaponisation of tariffs for political purposes – as most recently experienced by Brazil – and his increasing pressure on the rest of the world to side with the US against China generally, have since dampened earlier optimism and placed most of them in a dire predicament when it comes to balancing economic ties with China and political/security alignment with the US. While the degree of economic dependency on China and the US varies across the Global South, it is becoming increasingly clear that maintaining vital economic ties with China will come at a cost. Moreover, the economic benefits of aligning more closely with the US are far from guaranteed, given Trump’s ‘America First’ agenda and protectionist stance. At the same time, the bargaining power of the Global South, including that of the BRICS grouping, remains limited due to the absence of a cohesive foreign-policy agenda and widespread fragmentation on geopolitical issues.

Silver linings

Some opportunities, however, may emerge from these adversities. For a start, the effects of Trump’s aggressive and unpredictable approach are not confined to the Global South. It also extends to its Western allies, reinforcing the growing imperative for the latter states to pursue strategic de-risking in trade and economic cooperation, as well as diplomatic/political alliances. This dynamic is likely to create more opportunities for selective convergence between emerging economies and the West (excluding the US) on issues such as climate mitigation and adaptation, trade rules and reforms to the multilateral system (including the Bretton Woods financial architecture and the World Trade Organization) to make it better fit for purpose. The market opportunities offered by many large emerging economies and their rich endowment in critical minerals and key commodities, together with interest in securing their insertion in related supply chains, will also serve as powerful incentives for the West to seek closer relations with the Global South, especially at a time of trade tensions with the US and when succeeding in the green transition is becoming increasingly crucial for long-term economic security.

Reimagining non-alignment and BRICS in contemporary geopolitics

In view of the above, a policy of non-alignment or, rather, multi-alignment based on pragmatic considerations may remain a feasible strategy for Global South countries in their quest for greater autonomy and reduced exposure to political and geopolitical risks. This approach would involve cultivating a diverse network of partnerships tailored to specific issues: cooperating with Europe and other like-minded Western states on climate action, while engaging with China on economic-development initiatives. The latter, however, may prove the most complex and delicate relationship to manage alongside the US, especially concerning geopolitically sensitive infrastructure projects.

A similar approach could be adopted for South-to-South cooperation, including through platforms such as the BRICS forum. Rather than pursuing broad geopolitical alignment and political consensus – a strategy likely to fail given the heterogeneity and often divergent interests of Global South (including BRICS) countries – a more effective path would be to build issue-based coalitions focused on concrete areas of mutual interest. These could include joint investment in green energy and infrastructure (something the New Development Bank is already doing), the promotion of South–South trade, joint lobbying for global governance reforms and the exchange of best practices and technology in climate adaptation, among others.

Smaller emerging economies could benefit from strengthening regional integration platforms, such as ASEAN, the African Continental Free Trade Area and the South American trade bloc Mercosur, also by investing in regional connectivity. This could help address the persistent weakness of intra-regional trade in many parts of the Global South. Enhanced regional integration would, in turn, bolster these countries’ bargaining power in international and bilateral negotiations and increase their attractiveness to prospective international partners.

Of course, the appeal of mono-alignment with China may also grow, especially for emerging economies heavily reliant on Chinese trade and investment, depending on the severity and capriciousness of Trump’s trade policies. The response of Brazil, one of the leading ‘fence-sitters’ in the Global South, to the recent imposition of 50% US tariffs on its exports, should be closely watched for a measure of things to come.